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HUBER WINERY V. WILCHER: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
STATE REGULATIONS AND THE FREE TRADE OF WINE
WILLIAM H. BRAMMELL, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Before prohibition, the nation recognized Kentucky as the third
largest grape and wine producing state.' Prohibition ended Kentucky's
wine reign and tobacco gained increasing popularity with Kentucky
farmers. In recent years, however, tobacco's dwindling popularity (and
profit) has forced Kentucky's small farmers to consider crop diversification.
Small wineries provide a profitable alternative for the Kentucky farmer and
once again, grape and wine production occupies a significant role in the
state's agricultural economy.2 In Huber Winery v. Wilcher, the District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky evaluates the constitutional
validity of four Kentucky statutes that were designed to foster in-state wine
sales by imposing burdens on out of state wineries.
Section II of this Comment provides insight into the legal
background surrounding the issue in question. Section III explores the
context, specifically as it applies to the case at hand. Section IV evaluates
petitioner's arguments, the court's analysis and ultimate holding. Section V
explores the potential implications for Kentucky and the wine industry.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Granholm v. Heald
In Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issues of whether specific state regulatory schemes designed to promote
state wine sales discriminate against interstate commerce thus violating the
Commerce Clause as articulated in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution, and also whether such discrimination is
authorized by the Twenty-First Amendment.4 The case involved state laws
' Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2008-2009. B.A. 2006, University of Louisville; M.Sc. 2007, University College, London,
England; J.D. expected May 2010, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1 Ky. Dep't of Agric., Grape and Wine Program,
http://www.kyagr.com/marketing/plantmktg/grape.htm (last visited May 13, 2008).
2id.
3 Huber Winery v. Wilcher, 488 F.Supp. 2d 592, 595 (W.D.Ky.2006) [hereinafter Huber
Winery].
4 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,466 (2005) [hereinafter Granholm].
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of New York and Michigan that discriminated against out-of-state wineries
in favor of in-state wineries. While the details of the Michigan and New
York laws differed, both regimes worked:
to allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to
consumers in that State but to prohibit out-of-state
wineries from doing so, or at least, to make direct sales
impractical from an economic standpoint.5
The majority in Granholm clearly stated:
In all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate
the commerce clause if they mandate "differential
treatment of an in-state and out-of-state economic interest
that benefits the former and burdens the latter.",
6
To this end, the court held that states cannot "ban, or severely limit, the
direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct
shipment by in state producers."
7
In Huber Winery, the court interpreted the Supreme Court opinion
in Granholm as holding that statutory schemes treating out-of-state wine
producers differently than in-state producers by prohibiting or limiting
shipment of wine by out-of-state producers but not in-state producers
violate the Commerce Clause. 8  Further, Huber Winery applied the
Granholm rule that such laws cannot stand, "[a]bsent a showing that such
discrimination is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest and there is
not another less burdensome alternative to achieve that goal." 9
B. Three-Tier Distributions
The three-tier distribution scheme is a creation of post-prohibition
lawmaking designed to delineate distinct and separate roles for producers,
wholesalers, and retailers. Three-tier systems require producers to sell their
product to wholesalers and then wholesalers to sell the product to
retailers.' ° Constitutional problems do not generally arise in the operation
of a state's pure three-tier distribution scheme. The Supreme Court has
held that "states can mandate a three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise
'Id. at 466.
6 Id. at 472 (citing Ore. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994)).
7 Id. at 493.
Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 595 (citing Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493).
9Id.
'
0 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 469-70.
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of their authority under the Twenty-First Amendment."" Problems,
however, do arise when a state goes beyond operating a pure three-tier
system and provides exclusive exceptions to the scheme for in-state groups.
These exceptions are generally unconstitutional.
C. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
Four Kentucky statutes are specifically challenged in Huber
Winery: KRS §§ 243.032, 243.155, 243.156 and 244.165. KRS § 243.032
"provides that a restaurant making 50% or more of its sales as food may
obtain a license to serve wine by the glass for consumption on the premises,
but requires the licensee to purchase wine only from wholesalers."' 12 KRS
§ 244.165 "criminalizes the shipment of alcohol by out-of-state sellers to
any Kentucky resident who does not hold a valid wholesaler or distributor
retailer license."' 3 KRS § 243.155 authorizes certain activities for small
farm winery licensees and KRS § 243.156 authorizes certain activities for
farm winery licensees.
14
Plaintiffs argue that these statutes cumulatively grant "preferential
access to in-state wineries" by waiving certain requirements of the three-
tiered system for in-state wineries while maintaining the restrictions and
prohibitions in their full force against out-of-state wineries. 15 As in
Granholm, the object of the statutes in question is to "grant in-state
wineries a competitive advantage over wineries located beyond the States'
borders."' 6
III. CASE HISTORY
Plaintiffs, led by Huber Winery, challenged "certain provisions of
Kentucky law, which allegedly discriminate against interstate commerce by
prohibiting out-of-state wineries from selling and shipping wine directly to
consumers and retailers while allowing in-state wineries to do so on a
limited basis."' 7  Defendants were both Kentucky wine producers and
wholesalers.' 8
" Id. at 466 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 2 (The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited).
12 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 595.
13Id.
14 id.
15Id.
16 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 466.
"Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 594.
18 In Huber Winery the wine producers and wholesalers were represented by the Wine and
Spirits Wholesalers of Kentucky, Inc.
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Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in July of
2005.19 The judge, after conducting a status conference, concluded that it
would be most prudent to stay the proceedings since "the Kentucky General
Assembly was in the process of amending the challenged statutory
scheme. 2° Once the new legislation was adopted, the Plaintiffs asked the
judge to consider the motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding their
claim that the Kentucky statutes were unconstitutional. 21 The judge granted
this request.
22
The standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings
requires that "all well pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the
opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if
the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment., 23
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT
A. Holding
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky held that the "small" and "farm" winery exceptions to KRS
§§ 243.155 and 243.156 violate the Commerce Clause and are not
justifiable on the grounds that they are narrowly tailored to promote a local
interest.24  The court determined that the most appropriate means of
remedying the situation was to nullify only those provisions that espouse
in-state eligibility requirements, essentially extending all benefits to out-of-
state wineries. Further, the court held the In-Person Purchasing
Requirement found in KRS §§ 243.155(l)(f)(1) and 243.156(1)(h)(1)
invalid.26 The requirement imposed an unfair burden on states operating
wineries outside of Kentucky. In regard to KRS § 243.032, the Restaurant
Wine Licensing Statute, the court held that the rule requiring restaurants to
purchase wine from wholesalers did not discriminate unfairly against
out-of-state wineries because it applied equally to all wineries, whether in-
state or out-of-state.27
19 At that time the court also ruled on five then pending motions which are not relevant to the
current discussion.
20 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 594 n. I (stating that the court's original intention to host
oral arguments but proceeded otherwise in light of the many developments that occurred between the
first and second stage of the proceedings).
21 Id. at 594.22 id.
23 Id. (quoting S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478,
480 (6th Cir. 1973)).
24 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 600-01.
25 Id. at 601.26 Id. at 600-01.
27 Id. at 60 1.
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i. "Farm " and "Small Winery" Exceptions to the
Three- Tier System
KRS §§ 243.155 and 243.156 provide limited exceptions to the
three-tier system for "small" and "farm" wineries. As defined by KRS
§ 241.010 (46) a "small winery" must produce wine from "grapes, other
fruit, or honey produced in Kentucky . . . in an amount not to exceed
(50,000) gallons in one (1) year." 28 Similarly, a "farm winery" must be
"located on a Kentucky farm with a producing vineyard, orchard or similar
growing area, manufacturing and bottling wines in an amount not to exceed
twenty-five thousand (25,000) gallons per year.' 29
The two most controversial exceptions permit "small" or "farm"
wineries to "ship up to two cases of wine to a consumer who purchased the
wine in-person at the winery" and to "sell their wine directly to retailers at
wholesale price if the wine has been offered to wholesalers. 3 °  Only
Kentucky wineries are permitted to utilize these exceptions because, by
definition, only wineries located in Kentucky can be either "small" or
"farm" wineries. The result is that local wineries are able to bypass the
three-tier system and clear greater profits, much to the dismay of those
small wineries outside of the territorial boundaries of the Commonwealth.
Such ability of local wineries to bypass procedures otherwise required
presents the potential for Commerce Clause violations.
The Supreme Court, in Granholm, advanced a two-step analysis for
evaluating the constitutional legitimacy of such exceptions to three-tier
systems. The first question must be whether the statutory scheme violates
the Commerce Clause.3' Second, the court must ask whether the
discriminatory scheme, despite violating the Commerce Clause, "advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be served by reasonable
non-discriminatory purposes. 32
In Huber Winery, the court answered the first question in the
affirmative, deciding that the Kentucky scheme did discriminate against
out-of-state wineries in violation of the Commerce Clause. The definitions
of "small" and "farm" wineries, in conjunction with KRS §§ 243.155 and
243.156, essentially criminalized behavior for out-of-state wine producers
while condoning the same behavior when exercised by local, Kentucky
28 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 596 n.3 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 241.010(45) (2006) (amended 2008)). Author notes that the statutory definition for "small
winery" was included in KRS § 241.010(46) as written in 2006 when Huber Winery was decided,
however, the statute has since been amended and the definition is now found in KRS § 241.010(46).29 id.
'o Id. at 595.
"' Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.32 1d. (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
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wineries.3 This is the very type of behavior that the Granholm Court
dismissed as "straightforward attempts to discriminate in favor of local
producers. 34  Such a regulation, said the Court, is "contrary to the
Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.
3
The second stage of analysis, according to the Granholm Court,
requires making a determination of whether the local interests advanced are
legitimate and could be served by different "non-discriminatory" means.36
The respondents attempted to justify the discriminatory behavior by arguing
that temperance is a unique local interest that "cannot be served by allowing
shipment of wine into dry territories. ,37 The court pointed out that this
argument was unpersuasive because the Kentucky scheme "discriminates
based upon where the wine originates, not upon where it ends up" resulting
in little to no impact on the way wine is distributed in dry counties.38 The
court was clear that defendants "failed to demonstrate that restricting small
and farm winery licenses to in-state wineries serves the 'core value' of
"39temperance ....
ii. Remedy
The court next examined the question of which remedy is most
appropriate in dealing with the unconstitutional statutory scheme. The
court was presented with two clear alternatives. On the one hand the court
could completely nullify the statutory scheme. Alternatively, the court
could extend the scheme so that out-of-state wineries would receive the
same treatment as local, in-state wineries. All parties to the action agreed
that extension was the more desirable of the two options and most
consistent with precedent.4° The only interested party who contested these
issues were Kentucky wholesalers4' who urged, in an amicus brief, that the
court should "remove the small and farm winery" exceptions in their
entirety, suggesting that "nullification is necessary to preserve the intent of
the legislature in creating a three-tier distribution system.'
42
Acknowledging the intent of the legislature and its desire to
maintain a three-tier distribution system, the court determined that it would
be best to strike only the "offensive provisions" while maintaining the
33 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 596.
3 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
35 Id.
36 Id.
3 7 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 596.
3 ld. at 597.
39 Id. at 596.
40 Id. at 597 (quoting Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 n.5 (1984)).
41 Specifically, Wine Wholesalers and Kentucky Beer Wholesalers Association.
42 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 597 n.5.
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three-tier system.43 In practicality this approach extends benefits to
out-of-state wineries by nullifying all provisions espousing in-state
eligibility requirements. 44 The court executed this prerogative by enjoining
state defendants from enforcing KRS § 244.165 "against properly licensed
out-of-state farm and small wineries." 45 The court simultaneously struck
the KRS provisions that had the practical effect of limiting the exceptions
exclusively to Kentucky wineries.46
iii. In-Person Purchasing Requirement
Plaintiffs also challenged the in-person purchasing requirement in
KRS §§ 243.155(1)(f)(1) and 243.156(1)(h)(1). 47 The requirement provides
that only Kentucky residents who have visited the winery in person and
placed an order on the premises may have their wine shipped across state
lines to their home in Kentucky.48 Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief,
asserting "out-of-state wineries will have to incur a substantial cost in order
to meaningfully penetrate the Kentucky market.' 49 Defendants argued that
the requirement's effect was nothing more than "incidental" and could not
be held to violate the Commerce Clause. 50
The court again applied two-part Commerce Clause test from
Granholm. First, the court had to decide whether the statutory scheme
violated the Commerce Clause. Second, any discriminatory scheme would
have been justified if, despite violating the Commerce Clause, it "advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be served by reasonable
non-discriminatory purposes."5
Defendants sought to support the constitutional validity of the
scheme by advocating the presumption that "a wine consumer would
purchase from the closest winery[,] all things being equal. '52 The court
quickly dismissed this presumption on the premise that wine connoisseurs
consider much more than proximity in purchasing wines. The court pointed
out that "wine is a unique product" and that consumers are not expected to
purchase wine based purely on which producer is located closer
geographically.
53
43 Id. at 597.
"See id. at 597-598.
41 Id. at 597-598.
4Id. at 598.47 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 598.
Id. at 595.
49 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 598 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
5 0 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 598.
5' Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.
52 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 599.
53 id.
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In practicality, the statute required that if a Kentucky consumer
wanted to purchase wine from a winery in California, they would have to
visit the winery and place an order in person. After placing that order in
person, the California winery would be permitted to ship their wine to the
consumer in Kentucky. In attempting to justify the scheme and show its
state-to-state neutrality, the defense pointed out that wineries in the seven
bordering states are often closer in proximity to Kentuckians than are many
other wineries located inside the Commonwealth,54 the assertion being that
in many scenarios Kentuckians are actually encouraged (or at least not
discouraged) to visit other states to purchase wine. Plaintiffs, however,
pointed out that only 0.6% of the nation's wine production takes place in
the seven bordering states addressed by the defense.5" The remaining 99%
of wine production takes place at wineries elsewhere. 6 These wineries are,
for all practical purposes, forbidden from shipping wine directly into
Kentucky unless they can encourage Kentucky's wine consumers to visit
their winery on-site. The practical effect of the regulation was to
discourage Kentuckians from purchasing out-of-state wines while
concurrently encouraging consumers to purchase local wines. The court
held that this violated the Commerce Clause. 7
The statute would have still been justified if the defendant can
prove that, despite violating the Commerce Clause, the statute is the least
discriminatory means of achieving a justified state interest. The defendants
proposed three "legitimate reasons for the challenged laws."58 First, they
renewed their argument from earlier in the case and argue that the in-person
purchasing requirement promotes temperance.5 9 Second, defendants argued
that the "in-person requirement increases the risk of underage drinking." 60
Finally, the defendants argued that the in-person sales requirement is
motivated by "concerns for tax revenue and that removing the requirement
may result in a 'potential loss of revenue in excise taxes'."6' The court was
not persuaded by any of the aforementioned justifications and struck down
both KRS §§ 243.155(1)(f)(1) and 243.156(1)(h)(1). 62
54Id. at 598.
55 Id.
16 Id. at 598-99.
17 Id. at 599.
58 Huber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 599.
59 Id.
60 Id., at 600.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 600-01.
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iv. Restaurant Wine Licensing Statute
Plaintiffs finally challenged the constitutionality of KRS 243.032,
the Restaurant Wine Licensing Statute, which provides that "restaurants in
Kentucky that are licensed to serve wine on the premises 'shall purchase
wine only from licensed wholesalers." 6 3 Plaintiffs asserted that the statute
"prohibits such restaurants from buying wine directly from out-of-state
wineries." 4 The court, however, made the point that the KRS § 243.032
requirement to purchase wine from wholesalers not only prohibits
restaurants from purchasing wine from out-of-state wineries but also from
in-state wineries.65 The court held that since the statute does not "expressly
favor in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries" that the
statute cannot violate the Commerce Clause.66 The statute is valid.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The rejection of the Kentucky Statutes presents difficult policy
questions for the Kentucky General Assembly regarding how to ensure the
continuing development of local wineries without violating the Commerce
Clause. The rejection of the Kentucky statutory scheme should also serve
as a warning to other states that are trying to protect local industries by
offering somewhat discriminatory benefits to in-state businesses.
As previously discussed, the wine industry in both Kentucky and
the United States is rapidly growing. The issues presented in Huber Winery
are not going to disappear but will likely become more common, begging
the question of how legislatures are to protect the local industry without
violating the Commerce Clause.
The first and perhaps most important lesson to recognize from
Granholm and Huber is that states may not distinguish between in-state and
out-of-state wineries in regard to regulation. States must approve and
promulgate laws that apply equally to in-state and out-of-state wineries.
With this being said, there are a number of alternative ways of bolstering
local industry without creating such blatantly preferential systems.
First, states can experiment in reciprocity agreements with other
states "which allow direct shipment from wineries outside the State,
provided the State of origin affords similar non-discriminatory treatment.6
7
Second, states can utilize other incentives such as tax breaks for
what would traditionally be termed either "small" or "farm" wineries.
61 Id. at 601.
mHuber Winery, 488 F.Supp. 2d at 601.
65 Id.
66id.
61 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 467-68.
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While not providing indiscriminate treatment, such incentives will provide
motivation for small farmers who need an extra boost.
Third, states can promote the wine industry as not only an
agricultural product but as a tourism and travel destination. Much of the
excitement about "small" and "farm" wineries comes not from what wine
they bottle but from the experience they provide when you visit their
operation. Commonly these small wineries supplement their sale of wine
with related forms of entertainment: concerts, dinners and art shows. Such
a niche industry can thrive if properly promoted as tourism and travel
destinations.
There is no doubt that the rejection of the "small" and "farm"
winery exceptions will prove to be an impediment to the growth and
continued prosperity of small wineries. The bottom line, however, is that
the declaration that preferential statutory schemes like the one in Huber are
unconstitutional does not have to destroy small and farm wineries. There
are a number of alternative means of supporting the local wine industry,
and it will be up to the legislature and the continued hard work of local
farmers to ensure that these means are implemented.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wineries are going to be important to the future of agriculture in
the United States. This perhaps rings even more true for Kentucky
agriculture, considering the dismal state of tobacco. The Kentucky
Legislature and local vintners will have to work hard to promote growth
while working inside the boundaries established by the Commerce Clause.
The body of law regarding wine sales and the Commerce Clause is not fully
developed. It will prove useful if those influential in the drafting of new
state statutes take into consideration the potential constitutional
implications that the Commerce Clause has on the regulation of wine.
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